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How Network Structure Impacts Firm Performance:
The Moderating Effect of Network Openness and
Interfirm Governance
Kyunghee Kim*
Jeongtae Kim**
Junhong Min***
Sungmin Ryu****

Despite the importance of the impact of network structure on the relationships between firms and
firm performance, few studies have investigated these effects. This study investigates how network
openness influences the relationships between TSI, opportunism, technological uncertainty, and supplier
performance. We also try to figure out how network openness functions as a governance mechanism.
Key words: Network openness, Governance, TSI, Opportunism, Technological uncertainty

Payan (2008) found that the strategy used

Ⅰ. Introduction

by the manufacturer in a manufacturer-dealer
relationship tends to be used by the dealer in a
Understanding how dyadic exchange is influenced

dealer-customer relationship. Similarly, when

by the broader channel environment has become

selecting vendors, buyers consider not only the

a central issue in the B2B marketing field. Recent

buyer-vendor relationship but also the vendor-

network research studies revealed that focal

supplier relationship because the buyer can

dyadic relationships are influenced by other

benefit from good vendor-supplier relationships

relationships that represent “vertically-connected

(Wuyts et al., 2004). Furthermore, other scholars

dyads." For example, McFarland, Bloodgood, &

(e.g., Wang, Gu, & Dong, 2013) have provided
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evidence that the network provides governance

referring to the degree to which outside network

implications. They have found that punishing a

members easily enter into a certain network. As

distributor significantly reduces observers' (i.e.,

more firms open a section on their website in

other distributors) opportunistic behaviors. These

order to find suppliers or resellers (e.g., the HP

research studies have contributed to the development

Partner Program), they are able to secure

of network research and shed light on the

available alternatives. At the same time, the

governance implications of relationships within a

current level of network openness is rising, and

network.

such a business environment may have a positive

With few exceptions (e.g., Anita & Frazier,

or negative influence on the current suppliers.

2001), previous B2B research has not fully taken

Thus, it is worthwhile to investigate how this

into account network characteristics and their

situation impacts firm behavior and firm

impact on interfirm governance and firm

performance.

performance despite the fact that different

We develop our conceptual framework on the

network characteristics impact firm behavior

basis of an integration of transaction cost economics

and firm performance differently. For example,

(TCE) and network theory to explore the impact

in franchisor-franchisee relationships, the franchisor

of network openness. In this way, our study

is concerned with severe contract enforcement

contributes to network governance research and

due to a highly dense network characterized by

network characteristics research at the same

a high level of information sharing (Anita &

time. Prior research (Eisingerich & Bell, 2008)

Frazier 2001). The same study also revealed

employing network openness focuses on firm

that when an individual franchisee has a strong

performance on the basis of case studies. These

position in the network (i.e., network centrality),

studies do not suggest the governance function

the franchisor refrains from severe contract

of network openness.

enforcement. Research in outside marketing

Therefore, we extend the empirical domain of

further revealed that while network centrality,

network openness. In addition to this, we also

tie strength, and tie stability have a positive

empirically prove that network openness has

relationship with firm performance, tie quality

governance implications.

does not (Li, Veliyath, and Tan, 2013). These

The rest of this article is organized as follows:

studies suggest the need to examine the impact

We first briefly provide a classification of network

of other types of network characteristics in the

theories to encourage a better understanding of

B2B context.

network structure and its impact on business

Therefore, in this study, we investigate the

interactions. We then provide the conceptual

effect of network openness, a network characteristic,

framework of network openness on which this
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study's propositions are predicted. We then

showed why a certain organization has more

propose our proposition based on network openness.

resources through Guanxi, which influences

Finally, we present the implications and discussion.

market performance. According to them, a firm
that builds a relationship with government-related
firms (e.g., state-owned enterprises and joint

Ⅱ. Theoretical Background and
Proposition

firms between local government and individuals)
easily obtains advantages over other firms in
terms of obtaining land, licenses, and distribution
channels. Consequently, other firms that do not

Scholars (e.g., Burt et al., 1994) classify
network studies into four broad groups depending

have this relationship have less opportunity to
access the same capital.

on how network structure affects the behavior

Second, embedding theory explains how economic

of network members: inequality hypotheses,

action is affected by social relations (Burt et al.,

contingency hypotheses, embedding hypotheses,

1994). Studies belonging to this category theoretically

and contagion hypotheses.

approach the business relationship on the basis

Although every event that surrounds a firm

of network theory, but incorporate transaction

does not necessarily affect it (Pfeffer & Salancik,

cost theory. For example, Wang, Gu, and Dong

1978), in the larger social context, network

(2013) investigated the effects of punishment

structure imposes a constraint on the behaviors

on observers of those who are interested in the

of network members. For example, in a study of

punishment of a peer with dysfunctional behavior

the relationship between network centrality and

(i.e., ex post opportunism).

firm abnormal returns, Swaminathan and Moorman

Wuyts et al. (2004) described the importance

(2009) demonstrated that partners of a central

of social relations in selecting/preferring business

firm in a network are likely to grant the central

partners. When buyers select vendors, they consider

firm more bargaining power because such position

the vendor-buyer relationship but also vendor-

means that the firm can wield power and influence.

supplier relationships as well. Similarly, in a

Therefore, the firm in a central network position

study examining the impact of customer innovation

is able to design the new relationship for stronger

knowledge on supplier innovation, Noordhoff et

financial performance.

al. (2011) argued that a high level of embeddedness

The four categories are as follows. First,
inequality theory accounts for the resource disparity

between a supplier and customer increases the
risk of opportunism.

between individuals, groups, and organizations

Third, contagion theory describes how ideas

(Burt et al., 1994). Gu, Hung, and Tse (2008)

and behaviors are transmitted between two

How Network Structure Impacts Firm Performance: The Moderating Effect of Network Openness and Interfirm Governance 21

individuals and, finally, assimilated (Burt et al.,

our study is confined to the supply chain network

1994). McFarland, Bloodgood, and Payan (2008)

and therefore the vertical network relationship

empirically proved the existence of supply chain

and network membership diversity is also confined

contagion - the spread of interfirm behaviors

to current and potential suppliers.

from one dyad to an adjacent dyad in the supply

The primary benefit of network openness is

chain. In their study, an influence strategy used

providing new network members with new knowledge

by a manufacturer in the manufacturer-dealer

and new ways of operating (Eisingerich et al.,

relationship is more likely to be used by the

2010). Some studies demonstrate the advantages

dealer in the dealer-customer relationship. Thus,

of an open network. For example, Rodan and

like people, firms are influenced by the presence

Galunic (2001) showed positive relationships

of habits that exist within the larger social

between knowledge heterogeneity and levels of

context.

innovation. McEvily & Zahher (1999) also proved

Fourth, contingency theory explains that a

that access to diverse information leads to

process changes as a function of its location in

competitive capabilities in a diverse network. In

the network structure (Burt et al., 1994). Anita

the interfirm marketing field, Swaminathan and

and Frazier (2001) described how the position of

Moorman (2009) explained network efficiency

an agent influences a principle's response to

as the level of knowledge, skill, and capability

contract enforcement. If the agent occupies a

heterogeneity of network members and show an

position of prominence for the agent's network,

inverted U-shaped relationship between network

meaning the network centrality of the agent, it

efficiency and firm abnormal returns. Therefore,

could influence information flow and behavioral

a diversified network has a positive relationship

expectations among other agents. Therefore, the

with firm returns to some extent. Eisingerich

principle intention to severely enforce the contract

and Bell (2008) also showed a positive relationship

to the central agent decreases to some degree.

between a diversified network and firm performance.
Although network openness has some advantages,
mentioned above, we argue that an open network

2.1 Network Openness

is likely to affect firm decision making and
Network openness refers to the degree to

behavior. For example, under a high level of

which buyers are willing to open their pool of

open network structure, sellers may try to modify

exchange partners beyond their existing partners

their marketing mix decisions (Wathne, Biong

and consider all firms outside of the network as

& Heide, 2001) to create enhanced customer

potential suppliers (Eisingerich, Bell, & Tracy,

value. In addition, such network structure may

2010). The boundary of a business network in

induce certain firm behaviors (i.e., curbing

22 ASIA MARKETING JOURNAL
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opportunistic behavior) that promote the continuance

that the suppliers are entering into a more

of a relationship with buyers (Jap & Ganesan,

competitive market. An increased level of

2000). It is, therefore, interesting to look at how

network openness could be a source of fear and

network openness impacts firm behavior and

anxiety to existing suppliers. Once the suppliers

performance.

perceive a new environment, they need to define

From the buyer’s point of view, a high level of

and interpret the new context and change their

network openness is quite beneficial because it

behaviors to correspond to the situation (Pfeffer

helps to find more effective suppliers. For

& Salancik, 1978). The suppliers are likely to

example, a new supplier offering a lower price

hesitate to behave opportunistically and try to

enables the buyer to realize both immediate cost

maintain a conflict-free relationship with buyers.

savings and considerable savings over time

In this process, the suppliers are most likely to

(Kranton, 1996; Wathne, Biong, & Heide, 2001).

conform to the expectations of buyers by regulating

A new potential supplier can also provide both

and modifying their behaviors. In this regard,

competitiveness and a broader range of products

buyer willingness to accept new suppliers could

for the buyer (Wathne, Biong, & Heide, 2001).

work as an efficient governance strategy.

Having multiple product options may allow the
buyer to save on transaction costs, such as

2.2 TSI

searching costs. Also, a new supplier may offer
“one-stop shopping" for the buyer, which means

Transaction-specific investment (TSI) refers

that all required products and services are

to an investment made by a supplier, having the

available from the same supplier (Wathne, Biong,

value only within an exchange relationship

& Heide, 2001).

between the supplier and buyer. This includes

The effects of network openness are partly

money invested in a joint R&D program, the

related to resource dependence logic in that

building of new plants, and equipment for

opening the network to potential suppliers will

production. For example, Samsung Engineering,

most likely result in increased alternatives for

a Korean construction company, requires its

buyers. The main premise of resource dependence

design suppliers to build Engineering Work

theory implies that an increased number of

Place (EWP) systems, which cannot be used in

supply sources results in reduced power, and

exchange relations other than Samsung. Due to

therefore influence, of the parties that supply

such attributes, this type of investment represents

resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).

the transferability of assets (Williamson, 1985)

To suppliers, a buyer’s decisions to increase
the level of network openness may give a signal

and creates dependency of the firms that invest
in these assets.

How Network Structure Impacts Firm Performance: The Moderating Effect of Network Openness and Interfirm Governance 23

Previous studies have proven that unilateral

large amount of effort to increase the satisfaction

TSI increases commitment in the relationship

of the buyer, which is most often achieved

(Anderson & Weitz, 1992), control over partner

through improved performance.

decisions (Heide & John, 1992), joint action,
relationship length (Joshi & Stump, 1999b; Yu,
Liao, & Lin, 2006), and information sharing

P1: TSI made by a supplier increases the
performance of the supplier.

(Frazier et al., 2009) and that it decreases
opportunism (Jap & Anderson, 2003; Vázquez,
Iglesias, & Rodríguez-del-Bosque, 2007).

Once a TSI is made by a supplier, it creates
a disparity between the supplier and the buyer.

In spite of the advantages, some mixed results

Whereas the buyer would have to pay the

have been shown in the relationship between

“at-least cost" to persuade alternative suppliers

TSI and performance. Some studies (e.g., Heide

to make an investment, the supplier would be

and Stump, 1995; Artz, 1999) found a negative

left with a substantial loss if the relationship

relationship between TSI and performance while

were terminated (Williamson, 1996).

some others (e.g., Lohtia and Krapfel, 1994;

As the level of network openness increases,

Brown, Dev, & Lee, 2009) argued for the

some aggressive suppliers that might be willing

positive impact of TSIs on performance. The

to make TSIs may appear. Intuitively, when

mixed results indicate that depending on the

there are many similar players in a market,

context, there might be different results.

competition for winning transactions will be

Ganesan (1994) and Joshi and Stump (1999a)

strong. At one extreme, the buyer does not need

indicated that TSIs made by a firm increase the

to pay anything to search and induce new

firm's dependence on its exchange partners.

investment. In addition, new potential suppliers

Consider a supplier that made TSIs for a certain

that provide differentiated products may also

exchange with a buyer. The supplier invests

make the buyer more likely to consider switching

money and effort into machinery, instruments,

suppliers (Wathne, Biong, & Heide, 2001). The

and procedures according to the requirements of

supplier that made the TSI becomes more

the buyer, which pose a “contractual hazard"

vulnerable in such an environment because the

(Williamson, 1985; Heide & John, 1992) to the

possibility of relationship termination is likely to

supplier. In this case, the supplier would desire

go up. This would probably happen even when

to maintain the overall health of the relationship

the buyer and the supplier have a close relationship

(Artz, 1999). Otherwise, its sunk costs would be

because intimacy is less important than economic

gone without any benefit to the supplier. Such

benefits (Wathne, Biong, & Heide, 2001).

circumstances influence the supplier to put in a

Consequently, the supplier most likely adapts its

24 ASIA MARKETING JOURNAL
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activities in order to survive (Pfeffer & Salancik,

Wathne & Heide 2000; Samaha, Palmatier, &

1978: 3) and to avoid a substantial loss resulting

Dant 2011). The party that is the victim of the

in relationship termination. To achieve this goal,

other party's opportunistic behavior suffers from

the supplier needs to satisfy its buyer through

increased costs (Wathne & Heide, 2000). The

performance improvements.

victimized party has to face damage while the

Therefore, we argue that the positive relationship
between TSI and firm performance gets stronger

opportunistic party can also ruin itself in terms
of its performance.

as the level of network openness increases

A supplier can probably obtain immediate

because the firm that made the investment will

benefits from withholding or distorting information.

put additional effort into its performance in

However, such behaviors will encourage its

order to prevent its investment from being

buyer to make wrong managerial decisions that

useless.

can substantially damage the buyer. In such
situations, the easiest way to prevent opportunistic

P2: The greater the level of network openness,

behavior is to squeeze the supplier. Furthermore,

the stronger the positive relationship

as the buyer realizes that the supplier cheated

between the supplier's TSI and supplier

and that it incurred damage, the buyer may

performance.

become more demanding of excessive or
unnecessary documentation and procedures to

2.3 Opportunism

prevent the same thing happening again.
Seeking a chance to deceive the buyer shows

Opportunism is destructive to both relationships

that the supplier lacks the intention to improve

and performance and is defined as “self-interest

its performance. Such suppliers may focus on

seeking with guile" (Williamson, 1985). It involves

the delivery or selling of products, but may not

“false or empty, that is, self-disbelieved, threats

care about product quality. Even when it notices

and promises" (Goffman, 1969; Williamson,

a deficit in the product, it may just hide it and

1975). In our study, we define opportunism as

deliver the product in expectation of it not being

any behavior and intention to benefit at the

detected. Therefore, there is very little likelihood

expense of others, such as altering or hiding

of improving performance, and the actual

facts and making false promises to exchange

performance will deteriorate.

partners.
The negative relationship between opportunism

P3: A supplier's opportunism will have negative

and performance has been supported by scholars

effects on the supplier's firm performance.

(e.g., Gundlach, Achrol, & Mentzer 1995;
How Network Structure Impacts Firm Performance: The Moderating Effect of Network Openness and Interfirm Governance 25

An increased number of potential suppliers

mechanism by reducing opportunism. Therefore,

will be perceived as competitive to the incumbent

we argue that network openness could moderate

suppliers. Opportunistic behavior is less likely to

a negative relationship between opportunism

occur in such situations. Since a supplier normally

and performance.

and inherently has a stronger motivation to
maintain a business relationship than a buyer

P4: The greater the level of network openness,

does, firms are more likely to improve their

the weaker the negative relationship

activities and behaviors (Pfeffer & Salancik,

between supplier opportunism and supplier

1978). When a supplier perceives many similar

performance.

companies in the market, it is less likely to
behave opportunistically toward the buyer

2.4 Technological Uncertainty

(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The supplier is well
aware that the buyer may switch to a new

As a key independent construct, environmental

supplier if it detects opportunistic behavior in

uncertainty has been actively researched.

the supplier. Therefore, the perceived threat of

Environmental uncertainty is defined as unanticipated

a terminated relationship would make the seller

changes in circumstances surrounding an exchange

reduce its opportunistic behavior and put forth

(Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997).

effort to improve performance.

Researchers provide various dimensions of

A network consists of many actors, and each

uncertainty such as ‘technological unpredictability,'

individual dyadic relationship influences other

which refers to the inability to forecast technical

relationships in the network (Håkansson &

requirements in the relationship accurately (Walker

Johanson, 1993). If a supplier behaves opportunistically

and Weber, 1984; Heide and John, 1990). In our

to pursue its own interests, it will eventually

study context, technological uncertainty can be

earn a negative reputation in the network. This

associated with engineering-related software

will have a negative impact on other exchange

and materials that are used for building a plant.

relationships it has with other partners. In

For example, a supplier may experience uncertainty

contrast, if the supplier is honest in its current

following changes in the standards or specifications

relationship, it will be able to establish a positive

(Heide and John, 1990) of steel materials, as

reputation and consequently have a positive

energy drilling is expanding to extreme areas

impact on other relationships because exchange

such as the deep sea.

in one relationship is conditioned by exchange in

Previous studies have found a negative relationship

another (Håkansson & Johanson, 1993). Thus,

between technological uncertainty and relationship

network openness functions as a governance

continuity or long-term orientation because buyers

26 ASIA MARKETING JOURNAL
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want to switch to a new partner with the

(Ganesan, 1994). Therefore, the buyer will attempt

appropriate technological capabilities to maintain

to increase the level of network openness to find

flexibility and respond to uncertainty (Heide

alternative suppliers. As the level of network

and John, 1990; Joshi and Stump, 1999b).

openness increases, a severe and competitive

No studies in the existing literature have
examined the relationship between technological

environment for the existing suppliers will be
created.

uncertainty and performance. If the technology

From the supplier's perspective, the expected

used in a main product is standardized, it

intense competition will be perceived as pressure

increases the adaptability of firms (Josh and

to improve performance. The supplier is well

Stump, 1999b). However, when there is no

aware that the buyer has to rely on other firms

standardized technology, technological uncertainty

that have technology the buyer needs to find

increases (Josh and Stump, 1999b). In such

other firms that have technology the buyer

situation, continuous efforts on the part of firms

needs (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The more

are required in order to not fall behind in the

open the network is, the higher the chance of

competition. However, when technology changes

finding a new partner the buyer has. Being

quickly, it naturally leads to reduced performance

under such pressure, the supplier is more likely

due to inappropriate technology being employed.

to put its best foot forward to improve performance

It is difficult to develop or improve technology

to satisfy its buyer and to maintain the exchange

on the basis of the perfect prediction of the

relationship. The supplier is likely to provide a

future because no firm in the world can predict

newly developed product specification that can

exactly what kind of technology will be required

increase efficiency before the buyer asks it to do

in the future. Therefore, existing technology

so. Thus, we argue that the negative relationship

becomes inappropriate technology when technology

between technological uncertainty and supplier

employed in an industry changes quickly.

performance will be positive when network

Consequently, firm performance will be reduced.

openness is high.

P5: Technological uncertainty will have negative
effects on supplier performance

P6: When the level of network openness is
greater, the negative relationship between
technological uncertainty and supplier

Because technological uncertainty decreases

performance will be reduced.

the adaptability of firms for markets, such
uncertainty will encourage a buyer to develop
relationships with multiple channel partners
How Network Structure Impacts Firm Performance: The Moderating Effect of Network Openness and Interfirm Governance 27

Ⅲ. Discussion

openness at the same time.
Second, this study found the possibility that a
certain network structure functions as a governance

The emphasis placed on the need to go

mechanism. This is probably not intended or

beyond the traditional focus of the individual

expected by buyers who announce that they

dyadic relationship has led to further research

will recruit qualified suppliers by opening the

on inter-dyadic relationships (e.g., Wathne,

supplier pool beyond the current business

Biong, & Heide, 2001; Antia & Frazier, 2001).

relationships. In such an unstable situation, a

Despite the growing body of research concerning

supplier’s motivation to maintain healthy business

the network environment, empirical studies on

conditions would be stronger if they made TSIs.

network governance and the impact of the

The best way to maintain business is to satisfy

network structure on business relationships

the buyers through high quality products and

remain rare. Recognizing these gaps, we made

punctual delivery. In a similar vein, this study

an attempt to investigate the effectiveness of

shows the possibility of using network structure

network openness on dyadic relationships.

as a means of curbing opportunism. Like other

The current study makes several contributions

positive mechanisms, such as monitoring, incentives,

to this field of research. First, our study focuses

and socialization to safeguard against opportunism

on the impact of network structure, while

(Wang et al., 2013), network openness could be

extant network studies in this field focused on

a governance mechanism. Such positive means

the interaction of business relationships to

could be more effective than negative means

achieve collective/individual interest (Salancik,

such as sanction (Wang, Gu, & Dong, 2013)

1995; Wuyts and Van den Bulte, 2012) through

because they do not necessarily cause conflict

network embeddedness. By focusing on a

between suppliers and between suppliers and

particular network structure, this study enables

buyers as well.

us to understand how the macro-level environment

One thing that should be noted is that network

affects firms' individual actions. Firms, especially

openness does not always positively influence

suppliers in our study, demonstrated increased

the conduct of suppliers. As the study results

performance when they made TSIs as network

show, network openness worsened the negative

openness increased. A high level of network

relationship between technological uncertainty

openness was also found to curb supplier

and performance.

opportunism. The suppliers, however, showed

In an individual setting, people sometimes

decreased performance as they confronted an

“choke under pressure," defined as performing

uncertain environment and a high level of network

suboptimally under high pressure conditions, and

28 ASIA MARKETING JOURNAL

Vol. 19 No. 01 April 2017

their performance becomes unsatisfactory; this

ineffective way and may have difficulties.

behavior is more likely when the task is complex,

This research shows that managers should be

which results in an undermining of performance

aware of the exact effects of decisions they

attainment (Baumeister & Showers, 1986;

make. Network openness benefits firms that

Murayama & Elliot, 2012).

require new information and technology. Our

Applying the study results to the company

research, however, suggests that network openness

level, firms may feel greater difficulty when

influences firm performance not by providing

they face a high level of network openness and

new knowledge, but by combining with the

technological uncertainty in combination. In a

situations the firms face.

way, this result is similar to a previous study

Network openness was found to have a positive

(Samaha, Palmatier, & Dant, 2011) that shows

influence when suppliers had TSIs. In addition,

dual expropriation through both unfairness and

it was also proven to curb the opportunism of

opportunism, which causes strong emotional

suppliers. Therefore, network openness can be

backlash in the victim. In our study, the

considered a network structure that helps buyers

combination of an increased number of competitors

govern channel members to some extent. However,

and an uncertain environment in exert pressure

it should also be noted that network openness

on companies, and under this pressure the companies

will not always have a positive impact on firm

might give up on improving performance and

performance. If transaction partners are faced

perform in an unsatisfactory manner.

with technological uncertainty, a high level of
network openness might not be a good decision.
In an environment of technological uncertainty,

Ⅳ. Managerial Implications

network openness increases the pressure on
suppliers, and hence performance is likely to be
decreased. It may be helpful to maintain a

Managers often deploy certain decisions to
obtain intended results. If mangers fully grasped

moderate level of network openness in this
situation, if possible.

the ramifications of the decisions that they
made, those decisions could be better utilized.
Firms are able to prepare solutions to mitigate
the expected problems or reconsider executing

Ⅴ. Limitations and Further
Research

the initial marketing decisions if undesirable
consequences are predicted. Without accurate
predictions, firms may use resources in an

Despite its contributions, this research study

How Network Structure Impacts Firm Performance: The Moderating Effect of Network Openness and Interfirm Governance 29

has some limitations. First, the construct of

pressured by network openness because companies

network openness was only viewed from the

change transaction partners frequently industry-

buyer’s perspective. That is, this research measured

wide due to rapid technological advances. Exploring

and focused on how actively buyers seek

the impact of network openness on the channel

second-tier suppliers. As a network member, a

relationship in other industries would be a useful

supplier could also actively find new customers

topic of future research.

and attempt to switch exchange partners, though

<Received March 28. 2017>

this is somewhat rare in reality. Therefore, further

<Revised April 24. 2017>

research needs to include the supplier’s perspective

<Accepted April 24. 2017>

to address all of the effects of network openness.
Second, questionnaires were distributed only
to the prime suppliers of the top manufacturers.
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